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| 2 | IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION |
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| 5 | IN RE: LIPITOR 2:14-MN-2502 |
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| 7 | TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 2016 |
| 8 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD M. GERGEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE |
| 9 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT GODGE |
| L O | |
| 1 | APPEARED FOR PLAINTIFFS: |
| L2 | |
| L3 | Blair Hahn, Esquire Mark Tanenbaum, Esquire |
| L 4 | |
| L5 | |
| 16 | APPEARED FOR DEFENDANTS: |
| L 7 | Mark Cheffo, Esquire |
| L8 | Michael Cole, Esquire |
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| 20 | |
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| 22 | |
| 23 | Court Reporter: Amy C. Diaz, RPR, CRR |
| 2 4 | P.O. Box 835 Charleston, SC 29402 |
| 25 | Proceedings recorded by mechanical shorthand Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription. |
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THE COURT: Judge, this is Blair Hahn and Mark 1 2 Tanenbaum. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Cheffo, are you there? We are. I'm here with Mike Cole. MR. CHEFFO: 4 THE COURT: I was about to declare the plaintiffs 5 6 the winner because you weren't there. 7 Folks, this is obviously in the MDL, and In 8 Re: Lipitor, 2:14-2502. 9 Could counsel identify themselves for the record, 10 beginning with plaintiffs' counsel? 11 MR. HAHN: Blair Hahn for the plaintiffs. 12 MR. TANENBAUM: Mark Tanenbaum. THE COURT: Defense counsel? 1.3 14 MR. CHEFFO: It's Mark Cheffo. 15 THE COURT: Yes. 16 MR. COLE: Mike Cole. 17 THE COURT: Folks, I have obviously received the 18 correspondence of counsel regarding the 80-milligram cases. 19 And let me just start, Mr. Hahn, with you, so I can 20 understand exactly what your wording means. 21 Have you reviewed the full inventory of all pending 22 MDL cases, identified those with 80 milligrams and then 23 evaluated whether they meet the standards of the Waters and 24 the SPARCL study? 25 MR. HAHN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So you have -- and --

MR. HAHN: Based on the fact sheets, we identified the 80-milligram cases and then went further, as necessary, until they were disqualified from the SPARCL analysis.

THE COURT: And the 80 -- and I know you had done a rough estimate when we started this process that you thought it was about 10 percent of your total cases. Did that vary once you actually got into the plaintiff fact sheets?

MR. HAHN: It's hard -- I don't know -- I don't think so, Judge, but that's just very rough, because we had paralegals that were pulling the fact sheets and then making the determinations originally because there were a lot of fact sheets and it was very obvious whether or not they met the criteria or not. So those were knocked off quickly and didn't make it.

THE COURT: Mr. Cheffo, have you made any independent review of the fact sheets from the defense end to confirm this?

MR. CHEFFO: We haven't done -- the quick answer is yes, we have done some, Your Honor. We didn't go through the entire inventory. We did some spot checking. I think we started to look a little bit at the Hanly Conroy because we thought, you know, based on our discussions that might make some sense. So we basically looked at Blair's and Hanly Conroy. And beyond that, I think -- I think that the rough

numbers that we had was 8 or 9 percent of the total inventory, based on certain fact sheet information, was 80 milligrams. But as I think we have learned, and Blair, sometimes people split the 80, so it's probably less than that.

THE COURT: I got you. I re-read the Waters article today. And I will tell you, I think plaintiffs make a valid point that, you know, about the SPARCL criteria.

And let me explain my reasoning about this. There are three studies that Waters -- as everybody knows, there are three studies that that article addresses: TNT, SPARCL and IDEAL. TNT and IDEAL deal with people with a history of cardiac disease. And when you look at all the four sort of metabolic-related risk factors, IDEAL and TNT, there is some increased risk with Lipitor, but neither are statistically significant for increased risk and none of them have a hazard ratio in excess of 2.

SPARCL, which has both statistical significance, that is the bottom of the range is more than 1, and the -- has a hazard ratio of more than 2, clearly exempts people who have a prior history of cardiac disease, so -- coronary artery disease. So I don't think we all know, and they don't -- this article doesn't presume to tell us why there might be a difference between TNT, IDEAL and then SPARCL. But it nonetheless is present.

And I think -- though I didn't consider that, frankly -- and I think, Mr. Cheffo, you are right about that -- that I think -- but I think the plaintiffs make a point that they don't really fall within the criteria.

So what you are telling me, Mr. Hahn, is the best of your knowledge, you don't have a plaintiff that meets the profile of a SPARCL subject for 80 milligrams?

MR. HAHN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Cheffo, you don't have for me any evidence -- you can't identify any plaintiff who might fit that profile?

MR. CHEFFO: Here is what I would say on that one, Your Honor. I would think probably we think we do. And we don't have complete information, and obviously we are in discovery, Your Honor knows that. What I would say is if you will recall the plaintiffs identified Brown, Stefano and Rocco. We've looked at those, you know, quite carefully, as I'm sure the plaintiffs have, and based on our information, we actually think the Brown case, again, based on what we know now, would fit within the criteria. Brown and Stefano, they basically -- I'm sorry -- Stefano and Rocco, I think the plaintiffs' concern was that those folks had, you know, coronary artery disease before, and that seems consistent with what our information shows, but Brown does not; and in fact, has some inclusion criteria, including this kind of

ocular issue, amaurosis fugax, which is kind of a transient ischemic attack, which is consistent with the SPARCL inclusion criteria.

So again, with the caveat that we haven't deposed them, we haven't done anything. But if you look at the information, and digging right now, Brown would actually seem to fit within what we understand the SPARCL criteria to be.

THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Hahn, can you tell me why you don't think Brown fits?

MR. HAHN: Ms. Brown was diagnosed with CHD the day that she was placed on 80 milligrams. So she -- she clearly had CHD before she was put on 80 milligrams. But for purposes of SPARCL, she had -- when she was put on 80 milligrams, she was diagnosed with heart disease.

THE COURT: So literally she -- she is at an appointment, she's diagnosed with coronary artery disease and she's then placed on the drug?

MR. HAHN: Yes, sir.

MR. CHEFFO: I would just say this, you know, not to split hairs, but these are relatively -- I think precision is important with the criteria. My understanding of the records is she actually had heart failure, and, you know, again with -- heart failure is actually not an exclusionary SPARCL criteria, it's not coronary artery disease. So again, I get it, you know, these are close contests, but

based on what we know of the records, heart failure, unless there is something I haven't seen or am missing, would not actually be an exclusionary factor, and that's not what led her to be diagnosed the next day.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. HAHN: We are pulling the medical record. I was reading off a summary, Judge. This woman also has Multiple Sclerosis.

THE COURT: Which is a really confounding thing, frankly, all by itself.

MR. CHEFFO: We've looked at that, too. And, you know, again, unless there is studies or, you know, in some regards -- I don't want to be arguing against my own position here -- but frankly, we've looked at the literature and haven't really seen MS in and of itself being kind of a risk factor for type 2 diabetes.

THE COURT: You know, I'm looking here at Waters and I need to go back and read SPARCL, but when it's describing -- when Waters is describing the SPARCL criteria, it says no known coronary disease. I mean, you are telling me that heart failure is not coronary disease?

MR. CHEFFO: Well, you know, that's -- yeah, I'm saying that that would be -- here is what I have -- and I also have a summary -- it says first of all in 2011 after the endocardiogram, her internist reported diagnosed with

unspecified systolic heart failure. The diagnosis does not carry forward, doesn't show up, it's not further discussed in the record. There is no one else who she says she had heart failure and it's not carried forward.

And as I understand it, and in asking kind of the experts and the folks who probably know more than I do, if -- based on that presentation, if she appeared towards SPARCL, she would not be excluded based on that.

MR. HAHN: I could also add that since our letter to the Court we have received from Ms. Brown -- because we have been in contact with her about, you know, her inclusion as a bellwether -- we have received from her an order from her doctor telling her that she's not to -- that he doesn't think it's in her best interests to participate in trial because of her Multiple Sclerosis. So she has asked us to dismiss the case anyway.

THE COURT: Listen, I might need -- if I was going to think further about this -- I'm now looking, you know, in realtime at the SPARCL article in the New England Journal of Medicine and it says: "In patients with recent stroke or TIA and without known coronary heart disease." I just can't believe heart failure, it doesn't fall into coronary heart disease. It just -- I mean, that just doesn't make any sense to me. I'm glad to read this more carefully. But it certainly is in conflict.

I'm also -- I mean, the moment I heard -- I didn't remember her name was Brown -- that there was a Multiple Sclerosis, it's just another sort of -- you know, it's not typical in any way. And, you know, listen, I have been -- I was expecting we would have dozens of Water -- people meeting the SPARCL criteria and we are down to one and we are splitting hairs over whether heart failure is coronary disease. I don't know. I'm fairly -- I will look again at that issue and read more carefully the article on SPARCL, but I'm fairly -- count me a sceptic right now.

MR. CHEFFO: Fair enough, Judge.

THE COURT: Let's talk for just a minute about where that leaves us. That's the -- you know, assuming we don't

THE COURT: Let's talk for just a minute about where that leaves us. That's the -- you know, assuming we don't have a case in the 80 milligrams, you know, I think the -- let me ask this first from the plaintiff: Is there any reason to believe that if we picked a 20- or 40-milligram case to try as a bellwether that you would have any class of cases or factual presentation or new theory that might survive specific causation, assuming the correctness of the Murphy order? Mr. Hahn?

MR. HAHN: The short answer is no, sir, Your Honor, we don't. Given the Murphy order and the Court's reading of the medicine, we are not going to be able to get a differential diagnosis that's going to survive.

THE COURT: Well, it's not a differential diagnosis,

you've got to show specific causation more likely than not.

And you have an opinion to that. And what I -- you know,
received from, you know, what I've seen from your specific
causation experts, we've just got two of them here, are
really that it's a risk factor, but none of it is, you know,
as a matter more likely than not. You can't statistically
demonstrate that. You haven't shown that you can eliminate
these other factors. You know, to me, I mean, we don't need
to reargue that.

But if we assume for a minute that the critical question then is whether the Court is correct regarding the standard, if you are telling me, Mr. Hahn, that if I'm correct, then you are not going to have a case that survives summary judgment?

MR. HAHN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Well, let's talk about what's -- you know, I have several options here. One option is I could issue my orders in this case and send the cases back to the districts from which they came. I am very mindful that if I do that, that is going to impose an enormous financial burden on plaintiffs and defendants, mainly plaintiffs' and defendant's counsel, and tremendous cost.

Is there a desire, not withstanding that, that either party wants me to do that?

MR. CHEFFO: I mean, if you would like, I have a

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proposal along those lines.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHEFFO: I don't want to cut you off, Judge.

THE COURT: Go right ahead, Mark.

MR. CHEFFO: Thank you. You know, this is -- I think I'm taking a little bit out of kind of column A and column B from some other litigations that we have all been involved in when we've had similar-type issues. And basically, you know, what Blair is saying is -- it's kind of not a surprise, I think he said it in his letter, right? And I'm not in no way being pejorative. I think that the plaintiffs' view, as I understood it, is look, you know, we understand Your Honor's ruling, we kind of disagree with it, we think ultimately if it stands we are not going to be able to satisfy that type standard, right?

So I think what is most efficient for this
litigation -- and ultimately that case and their -- you know,
is to have that ultimately reviewed, right? And I think that
what other courts in similar situations have done is they
have basically said, just issue an order to show cause and
said, look, you know, if anybody thinks that they are
differently situated or has some kind of different argument
or something else, they can come forward; if not, what we are
going to do is we are going to grant judgment on that.

And to the extent obviously you package it, if you

will -- my term, not yours, Your Honor -- but you issue your other rulings, and to the extent that there were any other independent bases for some or all of those cases to be granted summary judgment, they would then, you know, presumably get appealed to the Fourth Circuit and the Circuit Court would do what it's going to do. And I think that's the appropriate, you know, remedy in an MDL.

And obviously, if the Circuit Court affirms, then it's efficient and everyone hasn't spent a lot of time and effort and money on cases that are not viable. And if some or all of them were to, you know, if the Court were to have a different view, then obviously we will all be guided by that. And I think that is very customary in an MDL and typically the way courts have handled it. Because, you know, basically have your ruling and then kind of, you know, send it back, you know, where other courts are not bound by a District Court ruling, and then without appellate review, I think would be the most inefficient way.

So I guess the long way of saying, if the point is that there is a fundamental legal dispute about this, you know, we obviously think you are right and the plaintiffs think that maybe you are not, the most efficient way is to expeditiously grant summary judgment for all the cases on that ground, and anything else, get to the Fourth Circuit and have the Court review it.

THE COURT: Mr. Hahn, what are your thoughts?

MR. HAHN: Judge, I -- I believe that Mark was

cheating and reading off of my notepad. We basically agree.

He said one thing that gave me a little pause, which was that your *Daubert* rulings would not be binding on transferee courts. That it was my understanding that your general causation *Daubert* rulings would all be binding on transferee courts. And so that would be the only thing that we would have available to us would be go to the Fourth Circuit.

MR. CHEFFO: I'm sorry, Blair, I agree with you. I was talking more about like the Murphy or Handshoe, if they were, you know, if they were specific to Murphy, but the principles would be -- but we actually agree completely on that.

THE COURT: Yeah. You know, I have -- I mean, I think we need to -- we've got a fair amount of work to do here, a whole laundry list of orders that my chambers needs to get out and which we are actively working on. And I think the idea of -- let me just sort of formalize what I just asked Mr. Hahn in this hearing, which is, you know, is there any reason to believe that any plaintiff case would survive summary judgment if the standards set forth in that order were upheld and the answer is no, then I think we are -- I think that may make a lot of sense.

I just -- what I don't want to do is, you know, there is a huge burden on my colleagues all around the country to get these cases and try to put their arms around it, there is a huge burden on the plaintiff trying to manage these cases, and there is a huge burden on the defendant defending these cases. And I share the view of, apparently of all counsel, that that's really, you know, a really inefficient way to get to the end game here. Because what we need to know is whether the Court's specific causation analysis is correct, right? I mean, and to the extent that's -- I mean, we are going to reach general causation.

We are going to deal with dosage and all of that. So, you know, we'll have all of those issues addressed. We'll deal with efficacy and Fleming and Abramson and all of those, we'll do all of those issues.

But in the end game, you know, in the end of this, we are -- you know, I think making definitive rulings that are applicable to all the pending cases and then letting the plaintiff just tee it up as a clean attack on the Court's conclusions would -- and let the Fourth Circuit sort of likely have the final word there, I think that's -- that kind of makes sense to me.

MR. HAHN: The only thing I would say, Judge, is it's not an attack on your ruling.

THE COURT: I don't take anything anybody does

personally, okay? But, you know, obviously the -- you need not say that the Court was casual in reaching the decision. It was very carefully reasoned and thought through, but, you know, I have no delusions of perfection. And I think there is a reason we have appellate review is just for cases like this, and it deserves as quickly as possible a review. And it also has the benefit that in the event the Fourth Circuit did not agree with me, we would still have the MDL in place to address further issues as might be needed. And I might say if at any point the parties thought better of trying to find some resolution of this thing, I'm glad to do what I can to help bring that about, as well.

So are there other matters that we need to address right now?

MR. HAHN: Do we still need to have a status conference next week?

THE COURT: That was on my mind, as well. I mean, obviously I was planning to address these 80-milligram cases and all of that.

Mr. Cole, what do you think?

MR. COLE: I don't really see that we need to do anything because of where we are right now. We have a plan to go forward. And at least from our side we have a handle on all of our folks as to kind of where we are going, we can explain and we can work with Your Honor and Blair and Mark to

just sort of move this along. So it seems to me we probably don't need one, but I'm here and I don't mind doing it.

THE COURT: Well, I think one of the things I've never been crazy about is wasted effort, you know? I've always -- Mr. Hahn, do you have any reason we would need to get together next week?

MR. HAHN: No, sir, Your Honor. I think what we have right now is a Scheduling Order that is in place that brings us to you ultimately to rule on all of the outstanding issues with all of the experts, whether it be pending dose issues or Dr. Handshoe's opinion has yet to be ruled on.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. HAHN: So my expectation would be that the Court would rule on all of those pending expert issues --

THE COURT: Mr. Hahn, every issue. We intend to rule on every *Daubert* motion.

MR. HAHN: Yes, sir. And at that point then perhaps we could sit down and figure out the cleanest way for us to then have an appeal to the Fourth Circuit.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, we are going to -- rather than be spending time getting ready for our meeting next week, we are going to continue working on our orders because we get it that everybody is waiting and time is money. So, you know, we are plugging along here and we will continue those efforts.

MR. CHEFFO: Could I raise just one case management issue off the record, if that's acceptable? THE COURT: You want to do it off the record? Let's see if we've got anything else. Anything further we need to address? Okay. The hearing is now to a close and I'm directing my court reporter who is no longer on the record. I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-titled matter. Amy C. Diaz, RPR, CRR January 22, 2016 S/ Amy Diaz 2.1